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Abstract
The Snowden revelations in 2013 redrew the lines of debate surrounding surveillance, exposing the extent of state
surveillance across multiple nations and triggering legislative reform in many. In the UK, this was in the form of the
Investigatory Powers Act (2016). As a contribution to understanding resistance to expanding state surveillance activities,
this article reveals the intertwining of diverse interests and voices which speak in opposition to UK state surveillance.
Through a computational topic modelling-based mixed methods analysis of the submissions made to the draft
Investigatory Powers Bill consultation, the article demonstrates the diversity and intersection of discourses within
different actor groups, including civil society and the technology industry. We demonstrate that encryption is a key
issue for these groups, and is additionally conflated with a human rights discourse. This serves to unite seemingly
disparate interests by imbuing encryption with a responsibility for the protection of human rights, but also threatens to
legitimate corporate interests and distract from their own data-driven activities of surveillance capitalism.
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Introduction
The Snowden revelations redrew the lines of debate
surrounding surveillance, exposing not just the extent
of state surveillance practices in both the USA and the
UK, but blurring the boundaries between state and
corporate surveillance, implicating private corpora-
tions in state activities (Bauman et al., 2014; Lyon,
2015). As a result, the revelations could have been
disastrous not only for state relations but for the tech-
nology industry too. The industry responded to public
concerns by focusing on technical means to challenge
surveillance, using strengthening encryption as a basis
of their post-Snowden PR (Gürses et al., 2016). James
Clapper, then US director of national intelligence,
directly blamed Snowden for accelerating the onset of
commercial encryption, asserting that it had ‘a pro-
found effect on [states] ability to collect [data], partic-
ularly against terrorists’ (McLaughlin, 2016). States
have now begun to update legislation to both retro-
spectively legislate for capabilities exposed by
Snowden, but also to increase intelligence services’
access to, what former UK PM David Cameron
called, ‘communication between people which . . .we
cannot read’ (Griffin, 2015).
In the UK, this legislation came in the form of the
Investigatory Powers Act (2016). The aims of the Act
were to consolidate the UK’s patchwork of surveillance
laws to provide transparent, legal grounding to existing
powers and activities. However, concurrently, the Act
included several new powers. These included the bulk
collection of data surrounding online communication
and web browsing activities, and requests that the tech-
nology industry maintain capabilities to remove ‘elec-
tronic protection’ of communications, a term widely
interpreted as referring to encryption.
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This expansion of powers in the draft bill received
widespread criticism from multiple actors, throughout
its development and ultimately into the Act. This leg-
islation is particularly pertinent for research as it rep-
resents the first manifestation of legislating for
increased government surveillance post-Snowden, a
trend which has translated to other developed nations,
as most recently demonstrated by Australia’s passing
of the ‘Assistance and Access’ Act (2018). As these leg-
islative shifts spread, it becomes vital that shifts in
opposition to surveillance capability are thoroughly
explored too. These include the diversity of voices
and arguments within the debate, the complexity of
the relationships between these voices and arguments,
and the extent to which different voices are heard. This
article therefore addresses the following questions;
When states increase surveillance, who speaks up in
opposition? How is the issue of encryption situated in
wider anti-surveillance/pro-privacy debates? And how
do these discourses of resistance intersect and interre-
late across actor groups?
To answer these questions, this research draws on
written submissions made to the Investigatory Powers
bill consultation process. Given the post-Snowden
timing of the consultation and focus on the interrela-
tion of state and corporate infrastructure for surveil-
lance, the documents submitted to the consultation are
therefore as much a public performance of resistance as
they are an attempt to influence policy. Analysis of
these documents is conducted via an innovative
mixed methodology of quantitative text analysis and
qualitative interpretation, underpinned by computa-
tional grounded theory; an approach that emphasises
the cross-validation of methods using both computa-
tional and qualitative approaches (Nelson, 2017). This
analysis contributes to widening our understanding of
resistance as a complex interrelated nexus of diverse
stakeholders, that within the temporarily solidified
snapshot provided by the documents, has coalesced
around the issue of encryption.
Whilst the analysis identified a number of actors
within the debate, the article specifically examines
three core groups: civil liberties groups, digital rights
groups and the technology industry, and the way in
which they are positioned within the debate in relation
to one another. The research finds that encryption and
security were of particular concern across these groups,
demonstrating a strong resistance to legislative changes
that interfere with the current state of encryption in the
UK. However, the diversity of positions from which
these concerns resonate has entangled this security
focused resistance with another discourse, that of
human rights protection. The article asserts that in
turn the technology industry is thus utilising its privi-
leged position as providers of encryption technologies
to conflate their own activities with human rights pro-
tection, and to frame their data-driven activities of ‘sur-
veillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2015) as innocuous and
distant from state surveillance practices. This activity
influences but is also enabled by civil liberties groups
shifting their discourse towards encryption as a human
rights solution, partly through greater alignment with
Digital Rights groups, legitimating the technology
industry’s privileged position.
Literature review
Resisting surveillance: A multiplicity of actors
As Gary Marx (2016: 168) observes surveillance and
resistance are counterparts, enthralled in an ‘adversar-
ial social dance involving strategic moves, counter-
moves and counter-counter moves’. Whilst the process
Marx describes is rooted in individual actions, such as
fooling drug and lie detector tests, and the more strin-
gent methods of surveillance that emerge in response,
the Investigatory Powers Act itself can be considered
part of a cyclical resistance-surveillance process. Many
of the powers the Act introduces are aimed at filling in
data blind-spots or overcoming technologies which are
considered as resistant to state surveillance practices.
Such an approach is thoroughly characterised by the
justifications for increased powers which cite that crim-
inals and terrorists are ‘going dark’ or communicating
in ways that cannot be accessed. This position broadly
aims to frame privacy enhancing technologies, such as
encryption, as enablers of terrorist and criminal activity
and something which requires a response; to be
stopped or controlled in order to maintain national
security, thus resulting in the need for further acts of
surveillance, which in turn receive further resistance.
As the Snowden revelations highlighted, state sur-
veillance practices are today bound up in multiple rela-
tionships, drawing in a wide range of actors which are
necessary to enable them, particularly from the tech-
nology industry. Whilst this creates a stake for these
actors in the undertaking of surveillance, this is not
always welcome, often met with unwillingness and a
significant sense of resistance. As such, this has
expanded the array of actors which have a stake in
resisting state surveillance activities, beyond those in
civil society, who have frequently been at the focus of
research in this area (Bennett, 2008; Huey, 2010).
A number of studies have also focused on the direct
relationship between the surveyor and the surveilled,
concentrating on how individuals employ forms of
‘everyday resistance’ (Scott, 1985) to avoid the gaze
of surveillance, including activities to sabotage the col-
lection of data or the employment of privacy enhancing
technologies (Marx, 2003). These, along with the
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studies focusing solely on civil society, lack recognition
of what Martin et al. (2009: 213) termed the ‘complex
resistance nexus’. For these researchers, resistance rela-
tionships and activities in relation to challenging sur-
veillance practices are complex, multifaceted and shift
in relation to the proposals made and the groups impli-
cated, revealing a diversity of actors and arguments
whose linkages are otherwise lacking throughout
research in this area. Whilst more recent work has rec-
ognised that a variety of actors influence regulatory
and policy debates surrounding surveillance – including
the Investigatory Powers bill and the events leading up
to its creation (Hintz and Brown, 2017; Hintz and
Dencik, 2016) – the impact and interplay of their
actions and relationships with one another remains
somewhat under-explored. In response, this article con-
siders resistance to surveillance through the ‘multi-
actor’, ‘complex resistance nexus’ identified by
Martin et al. (2009) in their study of the UK’s
National Identity Scheme in the mid-2000s. This
approach recognises the potential for a presence of
multiple resistant actors in relation to surveillance pro-
posals and removes any limitations surrounding who is
selected for analysis – avoiding limiting the focus to
very specific actor groups such as pro-privacy/anti-
surveillance advocates and activists (Bennett, 2008;
Huey, 2010) – allowing for nuance in understanding
how diverse actors diverge and intersect in their resis-
tant positions.
Resistance, however, can take many forms and as a
concept is frequently used throughout sociological lit-
erature, despite little consensus emerging surrounding
its definition (Baaz et al., 2017; Courpasson and Vallas,
2016; Hollander and Einwohner, 2004). To this end
studies centring on processes of resistance have
ranged in focus from violent protests and riots, trans-
national and global movements, local labour disputes,
and less confrontational encounters of ‘everyday resis-
tance’ such as foot-dragging, false compliance and sab-
otage (Scott, 1985). This flexibility has led to charges
that such loose parameters allow ‘some scholars to see
it almost everywhere and others almost nowhere’
(Weitz, 2001: 669). Hollander and Einwohner’s (2004)
wide-ranging meta-analysis demonstrates this lack of
consensus, highlighting that action and opposition are
central to the concept but with varying agreement on
whether intention and recognition are necessary for an
act to be considered resistance. For example, Baaz
et al. argue that requiring explicit intent from those
involved can narrow the object and processes explored
within resistance research. Instead, they argue that
intentions of the actors involved should be considered
‘plural, complex, contradictory or evolving as well as
occasionally something the actor is not sure about,
views differently in retrospect or even is not able to
explain’ (Baaz et al., 2017: 23). Although such varia-
tions may seem problematic, Baaz et al. (2017: 14) refer
to them as ‘impressive’, insisting that resistance is
‘better understood as multidimensional, unstable and
a complex social construction in dynamic relations that
are related to differences of context’. In this sense, the
strength of the concept is embedded in its ability to
embrace ambiguities and respond to specific contexts
and assemblages. A more narrowly articulated defini-
tion would artificially obscure new and shifting forms
and sources of resistance (Courpasson and Vallas,
2016).
As such, resistance is much more a matter of the act,
than the intent (De Certeau, 1984). Whilst we may
think of resistance as typically emerging from below
through activists ‘acting’ with political intentions, the
‘interactional nature of resistance’ (Hollander and
Einwohner, 2004: 548) means that resistance can not
only be determined and defined by resisters own per-
ceptions, but is bound up in the complexity of interac-
tions with others and their reactions to them. As Miller
(1997) maintains, one of the problems with studies of
resistance is the tendency to try to make divisions
between the powerful and the powerless. This ignores
that there are multiple, complex hierarchical systems
within society that can result in actors being both pow-
erful and powerless, or dominant and resistant simul-
taneously in different contexts. The most prominent
way in which ‘powerful’ actors have been considered
more widely in resistance studies to date is through the
notion of ‘astroturfing’ (Lee, 2010; Walker, 2016). An
act which describes how organisations manipulate or
convince participants – whilst often attempting to hide
their involvement – to voice corporate concerns instead
of ones formed of the participants own beliefs, as in
‘grassroots’ activism (Walker, 2016). As Walker (2016)
points out, such a negative framing elides the potential
that two very different groups of actors may actually
align on an issue at particular junctures, and thus be of
mutual benefit to one another within a particular
bounded context. As such resistance should be under-
stood not purely as the domain of activists against a
single established power, but as a more nuanced
context-dependent multi-actor process.
The act of resistance focused on here is thus the
official submission of responses to state surveillance
legislation which aim to challenge, change or renegoti-
ate state surveillance practices. These responses, and
the objections which they contain, allow us to under-
stand who takes part in such resistance, how concerns
and proposals surrounding encryption are situated
within the debate by different actors, and how these
positions impact one another. As a result, it provides
a wider understanding of how resistance to changes of
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surveillance legislation is shaped in the UK within a
multi-actor framework.
Civil liberties: The challenges of protecting privacy
Organised resistance to surveillance issues is currently
most widely explored in Bennett’s(2008) work The
Privacy Advocates. For Bennet it was the diversity of
issues faced, and causes privileged by ‘advocates’, that
resulted in a ‘loose’ and ‘fragmented’ network that fell
short of becoming a successful social movement. Huey
(2010) has added that a key factor in this failure was in
the framing of the issue, noting the lack of clarity sur-
rounding whether the core focus for those involved was
anti-surveillance or instead on strengthening privacy
rights.
The two are often considered interchangeable, but
others have made useful distinctions between them.
Martin (1998) argues that whilst, ‘focus[ing] on privacy
directs attention to the individual whose privacy is
invaded; a focus on surveillance directs attention to
the exercise of power and to the groups that undertake
it’. This view relies heavily on the idea that privacy is
most frequently understood as an individual right,
borne out of forms of contemporary liberal individual-
ism in which individual judgement and conscience are
privileged and defended (Fairfield, 2005). However, as
Huey (2010: 706) argues, creating a movement based
on ‘anti-surveillance’ may have proved challenging as
there is no ‘ready hook upon which to construct legal,
moral, and ethical challenges to programs or regimes’.
On the other hand, a ‘right to privacy’ is already visible
in legislation, public discourse and enshrined in state
constitutions. Bennett (2008: 23) argues that despite
conceptual confusion over what we mean by privacy
and how best to frame the movement, ‘for better or
worse, privacy is still the concept around which the
major policy issues have been framed . . . and “privacy
advocates” have learned to live with it’. However, as
surveillance systems have become progressively more
complex and everyday life has become increasingly
mediated by technology, new issues are emerging
which may challenge such an assumption.
Surveillance’s interrelation with technology poses
specific challenges for civil liberties groups, forcing
new ‘multi-sectoral realities’ on ‘traditional human-
rights actors’, that have not necessarily had to engage
with technology as both adversary and potential activ-
ist tool (Guberek and Silva, 2014: 3). Guberek and
Silva (2014) identify an emerging skills gap making it
increasingly difficult for human rights advocacy to
keep up with the increasing significance of technology
as a social infrastructure without enhanced collabora-
tion. This gap is further acknowledged by the privacy
advocacy group, Privacy International (2018), who
have argued that the human-rights sector requires a
greater influx of technologists not simply as a trans-
plant into the sector, but as part of a broader cultural
shift that reorients the thinking of organisations in full.
Furthermore, Dencik et al. (2016) found post-Snowden
resistance to surveillance to be predominantly centred
on techno-legal concerns regarding the use of encryp-
tion and advocating for improved privacy and data
protection policy. They argue that this results in sur-
veillance remaining an issue of ‘tech-justice’ activists
which fails to resonate with wider social justice
movements.
Others have argued however, that the libertarian
ethos of individualistic privacy concerns does provide
a concept capable of bringing together ‘those who
would prefer a minimal, largely technical approach-
. . . and those who seek greater juridical and legislative
protection against abuses of power’ (Johns and Joyce,
2014), thus providing a position which allows for
diverse collaborations. For the civil liberties groups
concerned, one potential source of technologically
astute allies is therefore digital rights advocates.
Digital rights discourse
Recent years have seen growth in the usage of the term
‘digital rights’ in discussions of the way human rights
are applied to the digital age. Such discourse has been
driven in part by groups such as the Electronic Frontier
Foundation in the US and the Open Rights Group in
the UK who, in these particular national contexts, rely
on a ‘digital rights’ framing to focus their activities
specifically on issues relating to privacy, freedom of
expression and consumer rights online. In parallel
there has been a growth in governments and interna-
tional organisations creating declarations to protect
rights and freedoms in the digital age. Initiatives such
as the United Nations World Summit on Information
Society (WSIS) and subsequently the Internet
Governance Forum have represented global attempts
to draw human rights into debates surrounding inter-
net governance (Karppinen, 2017). These events have
drawn a wide spectrum of civil society organisations
attempting, with varying success (Padovani et al.,
2010), to raise the relevance of human rights in relation
to the emerging information society. Whilst civil liber-
ties groups’ familiarity with issues related to emerging
digital technologies have therefore grown in recent
years, in part due to increased integration with digital
rights groups, this integration comes with a complex
ideological history.
In the US context, digital rights groups, such as the
EFF – which heavily influenced the founding of the
UK’s core digital rights presence, the Open Rights
Group – are rooted in an ideology that was solidified
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in the 1990s through polemics from writers such as
Alvin Toffler, Esther Dyson and John Perry Barlow
(see Winner, 1997). This ideology celebrated the poten-
tial of online space to liberate individual freedoms from
the impositions of pre-existing state structures.
Identified by Winner (1997) as ‘cyberlibertarianism’
and later by Coleman and Golub (2008) as rooted in
broader American Liberal Libertarianism, it is an ethic
that emphasises empowerment of the free individual,
particularly via technological means alongside a dis-
trust of state institutions as intrinsically limiting of
individual freedoms. Whilst the reframing of the
debate as pro-privacy has drawn digital rights together
with civil liberties groups that still retain faith in jurid-
ical and legislative change (Johns and Joyce, 2014),
digital rights’ groups emphasis on tools (Daskal,
2018) continues to highlight differences with civil liber-
ties campaigners (Aouragh et al., 2015). Although this
distinction may be starting to shift, these groups retain
a historical preference rooted in the liberational
polemics of defending against policy rather than inter-
vening in it.
This ideology also has a shared history with Silicon
Valley and the technology industry more broadly, both
emerging from the radical individualist anti-statism of
the counter-cultural movement (Markoff, 2005;
Turner, 2006). Despite shared roots, digital rights
groups often sit in tension with the industry.
Increasingly prevalent practices such as mass data har-
vesting, or the locking down of technology through
intellectual property claims can draw these groups ire
as they impinge upon individual liberties of privacy and
autonomy. Messenger services Signal and Telegram
illustrate this tension well. These non-profits offer
open-source, encrypted communication products,
near indistinguishable from industry offerings, blurring
the line between tech product and activism in opposi-
tion to both state and corporate surveillance. Whilst
these open source offerings are not necessarily industry
products, they contribute to the broader notion that
technological solutions, whatever their provenance,
are the appropriate solutions. As Giridharadas (2019)
argues, this is part of a larger ideological formation
that encourages new companies to ‘zoom-in’ on socie-
tal issues to the point at which they become bounded,
solvable technical problems. Solving the technical
problem becomes conflated with solving the societal
issue, to the extent that broader structural issues of
politics, inequality and power become obscured. As
such despite resisting industry surveillance, the ele-
ments of digital rights advocacy that focus on techno-
logical solutions share this Silicon Valley ethos that the
technologically empowered individual can disempower
an overbearing state.
The technology industry
There is often an emphasis on the way portions of the
technology industry enable state surveillance practices,
through their own data-driven business practices.
Whilst these activities remain problematic
(Vaidhyanathan, 2011; Zuboff, 2015), the industry
also plays an overlooked resistant role in constraining
state surveillance too. Rozenshtein (2018) posits that
due to their growing involvement in mediating state
surveillance demands, no accurate analysis of surveil-
lance today can be undertaken without inclusion of
how these companies ‘constrain, not just enable, gov-
ernment surveillance’ (p. 106). Although this analysis is
grounded in reference to Silicon Valley’s technology
giants, conceiving them as ‘surveillance intermediaries’,
his description of ‘companies that stand between the
government and our data’ (p. 105) can be extended as
more commercial entities are pushed to assist, and
therefore mediate, state surveillance practices.
Taking an oppositional rather than facilitative posi-
tion to state surveillance also has its benefits for the
industry. By focusing the surveillance debate on state
surveillance it distinguishes it from, and obscures, com-
mercial surveillance (Gürses et al., 2016). For many
sectors it is also a valuable strategy to retain custom,
as they rely on public trust to maintain their customer
base (Chivers, 2019). As Rozenshtein (2018: 116) puts
it, the primary ‘victory’ of Snowden’s disclosures was
‘to increase incentives for the surveillance intermediar-
ies to resist the government’. This has inverted the post-
9/11 shift of greater industry and state collaboration,
driven by public opinion at the time, towards a perfor-
mance of privacy and security, guided by companies’
self-interest and image concerns, and thus resistant to
state intrusion into users’ data.
Encryption sits as a key tool in this realignment.
Historically associated both as a tool exclusive to the
state, yet also as a facilitator for democratic values
(Myers West, 2018), encryption generates significant
tension between corporate and state actors. There is,
however, a lack of empirical research exploring state
resistance within the industry, especially considering
their privileged ‘intermediary’ role. Some high-profile
cases around industry provision of encryption have
received attention, such as Apple v FBI, in which
Apple announced that they would not willingly assist
in unlocking an encrypted iPhone (Schulze, 2017), and
Facebook’s similar public positioning through the
enabling of end-to-end encryption in their WhatsApp
messenger service. These public expressions of concern
over the undermining of security in their products both
highlighted the intertwining of the technology industry
and state surveillance, but also publicly signalled the
industry’s shift to a more defensive rather than
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collaborative position. Encryption’s role is significant
for the industry. Whilst framed as a matter of personal
liberty for users, encryption also comes with many ben-
efits to the providing industries. Encryption allows
them to distance themselves from the requirements of
governments and the ethical and human rights con-
cerns this raises. It also distances industry from respon-
sibility for the communications they carry, whilst
embedding an astute corporate strategy of user liberty
and security which cannot be interfered with whatever
the regulatory regime.
Methodology
This study used a mix of both quantitative text analysis
and qualitative interpretation. The quantitative work
was performed using the Python programming language
as the framework to develop custom data extraction,
analysis, and visualisation techniques suitable for the
research topic. Broadly, this consisted of text processing,
cleaning and normalisation techniques common to nat-
ural language processing, and topic-modelling for the
extraction of themes from the corpus. Document simi-
larity measures were used to assess corpus coherence
and to check for the presence of outliers. Whilst the
use of computational text analysis is growing within
the social sciences, difficulties of interpreting the results
require a union of both quantitative and qualitative
assessment, as well as a focus on the meaningful inter-
pretability of computational outputs (Nelson, 2017). In
this study, qualitative assessment of the text analysis
process outputs was used to both validate the quantita-
tive modelling and then later to inform, direct and sup-
port the qualitative interpretation of the documents.
Data collection and preparation
To construct a suitable corpus of documents for anal-
ysis, researchers manually collected PDF copies of all
220 submissions to the Investigatory Powers consulta-
tion (November 2015–January 2016) from three parlia-
mentary committees: The Science and Technology
Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights
and the Joint Committee on the draft bill. Each docu-
ment was manually classified into nine different cate-
gories of actor. Priority was given to the way in which
authors identified themselves either within their sub-
mission or in public facing material. Where there was
a lack of clarity in classification a number of strategies
were adopted. First, the authors distinguished between
civil society and civil liberties NGOs as civil society
groups represented a highly diverse range of issues
without overall coherent aims that would warrant
grouping into a single classification. This resulted in a
further distinction being made between civil Liberties
groups and those that focus on digital rights based on
their histories, and the groups’ self-framing within their
submissions and mission statements. For example,
groups classified as digital rights included the
Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Open Rights
Group who have a lineage of working within the digital
rights space since the 1990s and early 2000s. Conversely
the civil liberties groups such as Liberty and Amnesty
International are characterised by their emphasis on
protecting human rights, usually through campaigns
and legal actions, and have long established historical
roots, dating back decades in the UK. Whilst these
groups have a long history of legal actions and cam-
paigns against surveillance practices, compared to the
digital rights groups, they are relative newcomers to
commenting on digital and technological issues.
Submissions from individuals that also held a key
role in a sector such as Government or Industry were
categorised according to their professional role.
Individuals and public figures with specialist knowl-
edge, but not representing the views of a particular
sector, such as academics and independent consultants,
were categorised as ‘Independent Experts’, similarly to
those termed ‘informed advocates’ elsewhere (Whitley
and Hosein, 2008). Retired individuals that no longer
worked in a sector were categorised as ‘Other’, recog-
nising that they may not express the contemporary
concerns of the relevant sector. This category also
included a range of submissions from members of the
public, alongside think tanks and independent regula-
tors whose organisational status excluded them from
other categories such as Government or Industry.
The diversity of their priorities also meant that group-
ing them together into their own organisational cate-
gories would have been redundant as they lacked a
coherent voice or concern. A description of the catego-
risation can be seen in Table 1.
Each document in the corpus was cleaned and toke-
nised to common text pre-processing standards.
Processing stages included cleaning the text of low
informational content such as URLs, the removal of
punctuation and ‘stop’ words such as ‘be’, ‘is’, ‘this’1
and common collocations of words were identified to
isolate phrases such as ‘Human rights’ and ‘freedom of
expression’.2
Topic modelling
Topic modelling is a well-established technique of
unsupervised machine learning, favoured by social sci-
entists ( for examples see Marciniak, 2016; Nelson,
2017; Torabi Asr and Taboada, 2019) for its potential
to support the exploration of latent structures in textu-
al data (DiMaggio, 2015). In other words, topic model-
ling can assist social scientists in unearthing the
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discourses that exist across a set of documents. The
result of a topic modelling process is the decomposition
of a corpus of documents into a document-to-topic
array and a term-to-topic array. For each array,
every term and every document are given a score indi-
cating the extent to which it is affiliated with each
topic. Firstly, these affiliation scores allow us to under-
stand what each topic is about, based on the most
strongly affiliated terms in the term-to-topic array.
Secondly, by providing each document an affiliation
score for every topic in the document-to-topic array,
topic modelling recognises that a single document may
express a multitude of topics. As such it is possible to
examine the extent to which a single document
expresses a range of different topics.
This study utilised a less conventional topic
modelling technique called Non-Negative Matrix
Factorisation (NMF) which performs well when dis-
cerning nuanced topics within a relatively homogenous
corpus. Homogeneity in this context refers to the sim-
ilarity of vocabulary. LDA works well in distinguishing
documents when their vocabulary differs substantially
but struggles to tease out the nuance of differing uses of
the same vocabulary. NMF is able to better discern this
nuance because of its reliance on weighted word scores.
These scores factor in how each word is used within
each document, and across the entire corpus of docu-
ments. However, NMF scales poorly, making it less
popular in applied large scale text processing tasks
where topic modelling is normally deployed. NMF pro-
duces affiliation scores that indicate the extent to which
a document expresses each topic through its use of
topic related words. This adds a level of complexity
where each document will vary in its degree of affilia-
tion not just with each topic, but with all topics entire-
ly, requiring additional steps when interpreting the
result of the modelling. Whilst a quantitative approach,
topic modelling should be understood as an interpreta-
tive method. The exact figures produced by the model
are better understood as indicators of potential pat-
terns for exploration, making it particularly useful for
a mixed-methods approach.
Implementing and refining the topic model
A limitation of topic modelling is that the model is
unable to determine how many topics exist within the
corpora and requires the number of topics (often
referred to as k) to be assigned before it begins model-
ling. This is a key issue for researchers and often the
recommendation is to rely on domain knowledge, such
as knowing you are modelling text from four different
forums, to specify the most likely number for k. This
limitation can be problematic for research applications
where computationally aided pattern extraction is
wanted without necessarily introducing bias by manu-
ally selecting the number of themes to be identified.
Initially, an exploratory topic model was run with k
corresponding to the number of actor categories, as an
assessment of the technique’s viability for the corpus.
Qualitative assessment of the model was performed by
examining the top words for each topic and the scores
that indicated what proportion of each document affil-
iated to each topic. Whilst the model had generally
performed well indicating strong topics such as
‘encryption’ and ‘oversight’ it was also highly sensitive,
with entire topics dominated by the content of one or
two documents. To address this, outliers were identi-
fied by visualising document similarity using a common
document similarity measure.3 This identified a single
document which was qualitatively assessed to be dis-
tinctive in its style and approach and inordinately influ-
ential in the overall modelling. This outlier was
removed, giving us a final corpus size of 219 docu-
ments. After removing the outlier from analysis, the
appropriate number of topics (k) was selected by
assessing the model for topic stability and topic coher-
ence (see Greene et al., 2014; O’Callaghan et al., 2015).4
These measures indicated that a seven-topic model pro-
duced the most stable topics with a high level of coher-
ence that was representative of the majority of the
corpus. After running the final model, a label was
derived for each topic by examining the top 20 most
affiliated terms and each topic’s most strongly affiliated
documents (Table 2).
Table 1. Final document classification after outlier removal.
Author category Document freq. Total words Avg. words per document
Civil liberties 16 119,660 7478
Digital rights 19 73,110 3847
Government 11 85,344 7758
ISP/Telecomms 20 74,232 3711
Independent expert 46 127,916 2781
Legal professional/Body 17 68,410 4024
Media/Journalism 7 14,733 2104
Other 70 127,427 1820
Tech industry 13 32,219 2478
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Findings
An overview of the topics identified
Table 2 displays the top 20 terms identified by the Topic
Modelling process for each topic, followed by an illus-
trative quotation, selected through a qualitative exami-
nation of the documents most strongly associated with
each topic. The qualitative examination then allowed for
an appropriate label to be ascribed to each topic.
Figure 1 demonstrates the intertwining of voices
within the debate by first grouping the documents by
actor type before calculating the mean affiliation score.
The thickness of the line from actor type to topic illus-
trates this averaged affiliation. The height of the bars to
the left indicate how strongly each actor group affiliat-
ed to all the topics identified. As expected, the docu-
ments with the weakest affiliation scores, i.e. the
shortest bar, were those categorised as ‘Other’. These
were the anomalous documents without clear affilia-
tion, and consequently, this group was disregarded
from further analysis. In addition, ‘Independent
Experts’ similarly covered a range of topics, but were
grouped as one due to the ‘informed’ (Whitley and
Hosein, 2008) nature of the concerns they expressed,
this is reflected in their submissions which are relatively
evenly distributed across all topics. The diversity of
their concerns without a clear sector affiliation meant
their documents were unsuited to this particular
method and therefore excluded from further analysis.
However, these independent experts made valuable
submissions to the consultation, which would warrant
follow-up qualitative work examining their role in chal-
lenging the legislation and the impact of their contri-
bution. The government express focus on particular
areas but their voice within the debate acts not as an
external stakeholder, but to legitimate policy pro-
posals, often writing in direct response to other sub-
missions and public debate and are therefore not
resistant to the legislation.
Figure 2 also shows these topic distributions and
provides scores that indicate the percentage of submis-
sion text (after normalising affiliation scores) that
affiliates to each topic, per author category.
An initial reading of Figure 2 indicates a range of
findings. First were the sectors that engaged almost
exclusively with a specific element of the debate.
‘Media and Journalism bodies’ focused heavily on ‘spe-
cial exemptions’ which related to the protection of jour-
nalistic sources indicating less a stake in wider debates,
but more concern with a single issue. Similarly, ISPs
and Telecomms groups spread their focus across
‘impact on industry’ and the ‘technical implementation’
of the bill, whilst Legal Professionals’ central concern
was ‘authorisation and oversight’.
Of particular interest to our research questions is
how diverse voices contribute to the debate. Of the
remaining actors there were indications of an overlap
in their topic affiliation, centralising around the issues
of encryption and human rights, suggesting a blurring
of actor domains within the debate.
Intertwining voices
As expected, the technology industry submissions have
particularly strong affiliations with the topics of
‘Encryption and Security’ and ‘Impact on Industry’.
However, the findings also highlight the Industry’s affil-
iation with the topic of ‘Human Rights’, supporting find-
ings from recent research (Jørgensen, 2017, 2018) which
suggests that Industry actors view themselves as commit-
ted to Human Rights, working to actively promote and
Figure 1. Average distribution of submission text to topic per author category.
Stevens and Allen-Robertson 9
challenge issues in this area. Whilst Civil Liberties groups
showed strong affiliation with the legal process through
‘Authorisation and Oversight’ they also expressed affili-
ation with the issue of ‘Encryption and Security’, despite
research suggesting that these groups need to work on
improving their knowledge and understanding surround-
ing technical issues (Guberek and Silva, 2014). Digital
Rights groups’ submissions show a stronger affiliation
with ‘Technical Implementation’ and ‘Encryption and
Security’ than they do with ‘Authorisation and
Oversight’, reflecting their focus on the nuances of tech-
nology over legal concerns. However, the findings also
show that Digital rights groups’ arguments were strongly
affiliated with ‘Human Rights’ discourse. This suggests a
convergence of digital rights and human rights discourse
as the locus of concern for these different groups within
civil society, exemplified further by emerging and diverse
campaigning coalitions such as ‘Don’t Spy Us’.55 Guided
by these findings from the topic modelling, the following
sections report insights from the qualitative examination
of the submissions strongly affiliated with the theme of
‘Encryption and Security’, to consider the emergent
effects of the intersection of these different key groups
around the issue of encryption.
The technology industry and human rights
As indicated by the topic modelling, whilst the technology
industry substantially discussed the impact of the bill on
industry and encryption, their submissions also utilised a
human rights discourse otherwise predominantly used by
the digital rights and civil liberties groups. In part this can
be seen in the submissions as a recognition of the indus-
try’s emerging influence in social and power relations;
we recognise that our products, technology, and oper-
ating footprint increasingly intersect with human rights
issues . . . and that as a company, we have an obligation
Figure 2. Heatmap of categories against topic affiliation – mean of per category affiliation score.
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to engage responsibly, to respect the rights of our users
and to promote the principles of free expression and
privacy. (Technology Industry – Joint Committee)
With others noting that they have a role in ‘ensuring
that citizens’ human rights and privacy rights are pro-
tected’ (Technology Industry – Joint Committee).
This interest in promoting themselves as protective of
user safety and users’ rights is strongly linked to discus-
sions of their implementation of user level encryption as
protection from state surveillance powers and a rejection
of state-imposed regulation of encryption: ‘[A]ll Internet
users have an expectation of privacy . . . and companies
and technologists continue to support this expectation
through policy and through technology’ (Technology
Industry – Science and Technology Committee). ‘[E]
ncryption is . . . crucial to ensuring the safety of web
users worldwide. We reject any proposals that would
require companies to deliberately weaken the security of
their products via backdoors, forced decryption, or any
other means’ (Technology Industry – Joint Committee).
In the case of one submission, this responsibility is
elaborated into a broader moral imperative: ‘We will
continue to deploy strong encryption methods because
we firmly believe [it is] ultimately in the best interests of
humanity’ (Technology Industry – Joint Committee).
As providers of encrypted services, this conflation of
encryption with a user rights discourse allows the indus-
try not only to position themselves as acting in the best
interests of their users, but to construct themselves as the
protectors of our rights in online spaces. The position
held by the industry, whilst recognising that technolog-
ical development has contributed to the problem of
expanding surveillance practices, is that individual-level
encryption is the solution to protecting individual free-
dom; an ultimately cyberlibertarian view. More con-
cretely, as the providers of those solutions, their
discourse also drives more users to the industry’s com-
munication platforms, as the only means by which trust
in secure technology and communications can be main-
tained. This follows long strained debates surrounding
the regulation of encryption, often led by digital rights
groups along with the industry who have argued strong-
ly that it must remain free from state intervention (Levy,
2001). Through these arguments, encryption is posi-
tioned as central to the protection of privacy and
rights online in response to increasing state surveillance
practices. An argument which was also identified in the
submissions of civil liberties and digital rights groups.
Civil liberties, digital rights and encryption
as protection
In the past, technical arguments and approaches to
countering state surveillance were often considered
the domain of the ‘geeks’ (Bennett, 2008: 82), solely
residing within the campaigns of digital rights groups
and wider expert communities (Levy, 2001), supported
by research which highlights a lack of engagement with
technical issues from civil liberties groups (Guberek
and Silva, 2014). However, this appears to be shifting
as encryption is presented as an important topic for
many civil liberties organisations, in part due to a
larger declaration at the UN level which supports an
explicit link between encryption and human rights
(Myers West, 2018).
A closer reading of the documents affiliated with the
‘Encryption and Security’ topic revealed that core to
much of the discussions from Civil Liberties groups
surrounding encryption was in framing it as an enabler
and protector of human rights online. Statements such
as; ‘end-to-end encryption is essential to the protection
of privacy and free expression in the digital era’ (Civil
Liberties Group – Joint Committee), and that ‘[a]ny
provisions that could be interpreted to require compa-
nies to weaken secured services or build backdoors into
encryption raises serious human rights concerns’ (Civil
Liberties Group – Joint Committee). Encryption and
other technical issues such as equipment interference,
data retention and security issues also featured fre-
quently throughout the submissions of these groups,
highlighting a broadening in their focus towards tech-
nology and technical issues. This emergent concern
from civil liberties groups that technological interven-
tions should be considered ‘essential’ to the protection
of human rights in the digital era is more akin to what
was expected from the digital rights groups, who have
historically shared the technology industry’s ideologi-
cally libertarian and technologically determinist roots
and their championing of technology as a viable solu-
tion to social problems (Coleman and Golub, 2008;
Winner, 1997).
This approach was illustrated throughout Digital
Rights groups’ submissions, as concern for human
rights, integrity of the internet and the health of the
economy were concurrently highlighted whilst retain-
ing a strong focus on the role of technology in their
maintenance; ‘Encryption not only facilitates the free
exercise of human rights, but it also benefits the econ-
omy, dissuades against device theft, and protects
against unauthorised access [to] sensitive data.’
(Digital Rights – Science and Technology).
However, through arguing for the value of encryp-
tion as a tool to ensure individual liberties, there also
appears to be increasing recognition of the unequal
gaze of surveillance powers, and who may be most
affected by their expansion; ‘encryption allows journal-
ists, activists, and members of at-risk populations to
communicate . . .For example, in spite of threats of
harassment, imprisonment, or death, encryption
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allows LGBT persons the ability to communicate and
seek knowledge and support’ (Digital Rights – Science
and Technology).
This frames the case for encryption through a lens of
supporting and protecting the rights of those who are
most vulnerable within societies, broadening the polit-
ical approach to consider who and what should be
protected from expanding state surveillance practices.
This politicises their arguments in line with civil liber-
ties groups whose concerns most frequently lie with the
vulnerable or marginalised, who often find themselves
central to the gaze of surveillance. However, this align-
ment towards technological solutions for the protection
of human rights from both digital rights and civil lib-
erties groups, also affords opportunities for the pro-
viders of these technologies to position themselves as
central to, and the guarantors of, human rights in dig-
ital spaces. This position was also strengthened by sev-
eral of these groups who – far from taking a critical
position towards the industry – in their own submis-
sions, directly quoted comments made in support of
protecting encryption from well-known industry fig-
ures, such as Tim Cook and Mark Zuckerberg. For
example, as one civil liberties group stated;
A number of technology companies have warned that
this could be a threat to strong encryption in the UK.
Encryption protects ordinary citizens and is vital to a
myriad of online activities. Its use has been supported
by the ICO, Mark Zuckerberg, the Information
Technology Industry Council and Tim Cook. Any
clauses that seem like they may weaken it will also
harm innocent citizens. . .
Consequently, this demonstrated an endorsement of
industry views within this context of challenging the
state. Such a practice further highlights the entangle-
ment of different voices within the debate and how the
presence of multiple actors can influence one another’s
engagement with different issues.
Discussion: Encrypting human rights
A key insight illuminated by the quantitative analysis is
the intertwining and interconnectivity of diverse resis-
tant voices and discourses within the surveillance
debate, particularly surrounding encryption. Not only
are a range of actors involved in the debate, but they
also share intersecting positions, demonstrating the
importance of taking a multi-actor approach to study-
ing processes of resistance. These broader insights
guided the qualitative analysis, which in this case,
highlighted an emerging focus on encryption as a key
component in the protection of human rights, a
position shared by civil liberties, digital rights groups
and the technology industry.
Within this intersecting discussion, encryption is
positioned as the enabler and protector of the right to
privacy and freedom of expression online and therefore
something which must be protected from interference
by state surveillance practices. This notion centralises
technical solutions to political and civil issues in resis-
tance debates, which is strengthened through associa-
tion with the logic of individual human rights
protection. This imbues encryption and broader tech-
nological interventions as an ‘all-encompassing agent
of change’, characterised by its viability to meet the
desired social goal of privacy protection (Marx, 2010:
564). Under this identity, encryption becomes the final
frontier to state surveillance, as a technology which
bypasses any legislative declarations or any future
political or moral debates.
Encryption, however, is not valueless but carries a
history of crypto-freedom politics couched within a
broader cyberlibertarian ethic (Coleman and Golub,
2008; Golumbia, 2016; Winner, 1997). These politics
are maintained in contemporary debates through a dis-
course of digital rights which often champion personal
protection from social issues through technological sol-
utions such as encryption (Daskal, 2018). Whilst more
traditional civil liberties groups maintain a focus on
legislative or policy reform, they are also embracing
technologies promoted by digital rights groups and
the industry. This has shifted encryption out of the
technical domain and embedded it within civil liberties
groups’ ongoing human rights focus, strengthened
through collaborative projects such as the ‘Don’t Spy
on Us’ campaign. This convergence has also meant that
the more focussed priorities of the digital rights groups
have been broadened, from a strict focus on internet
sovereignty and the implied cybercultural elite of the
past, to a recognition of more vulnerable groups and
their needs within societies. Together, these two groups
for civil and digital liberties are producing intersecting
discourses that can provide reciprocal legitimation for
their emerging, and converging, positions.
However, this entanglement of resistant actors,
influences, and is influenced by the third key group
identified within the debate, the technology industry
itself. Those who control the mainstream implementa-
tions of encryption technologies and communications
have seized the opportunity to reframe themselves as
guarantors of liberty in opposition to the state, or as
providers of what Mejias (2012) terms ‘liberation tech-
nologies’. In their utilisation of a human rights dis-
course, they situate themselves within the moral
economy of civil society, legitimated by the activist
groups who contribute heavily to instilling encryption
technology with social power. Meanwhile, many of the
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corporations utilising this position are themselves built
on a data-driven logic of accumulation, constitutive of
‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2015), through which
the extraction and commodification of Big Data threat-
en privacy in numerous ways (Lyon, 2014). This self-
positioning of companies as our protectors, therefore
also presents an attempt to reinforce a false dichotomy
of intrusive and dangerous state surveillance practices
and benevolent corporate surveillance, strategically
redirecting public attention away from the activities
upon which surveillance capitalism thrives.
Whilst encryption can allow individuals to better pro-
tect themselves from both state and corporate surveil-
lance, the push towards popular encryption services also
further perpetuates the ‘infrastructure imperialism’ that
monopolises our everyday communication structures
(Vaidhyanathan, 2011). Within that infrastructure pri-
vacy becomes a valued consumer feature that perpetu-
ates a depoliticisation of surveillance and privacy issues
(Gürses et al., 2016). Surveillance, and protection from
it, are rendered instead as part of neoliberal market
rationality in which privacy becomes a consumer pref-
erence or marketable consumer feature (Jørgensen,
2018). As such, human rights abuses related to surveil-
lance are framed as occurring solely within state activi-
ties, and activities to protect human rights through
technological self-protection become ‘anchored in a
commercial rather than civic domain’ (Jørgensen,
2017: 292). This is characteristic of a cyberlibertarian
way of thinking, which frequently ‘conflate[s] the activ-
ities of freedom seeking individuals, with the operations
of enormous, profit seeking business firms’ (Winner,
1997: 16), discounting that such an approach reduces
privacy to something which is only available to either
the most technologically skilled, or those who can afford
to pay for premium privacy services.
Whilst civil liberties groups do of course retain their
role in human rights protection within the political and
judicial sphere, they too recognise and increasingly pro-
mote encryption as protecting human rights and limit-
ing the reach of state surveillance, despite this position
threatening to legitimate the ‘protector’ identity
adopted by the industry. Whilst enabling the industry’s
self-serving narratives of human rights protection is
presumably unintentional, this will likely remain a
pragmatic path to follow for the civil liberties groups.
The industry’s powerful PR machine can undoubtedly
be a helpful ally in highlighting government practices
and providing a form of resistance both legally through
challenges to state requests, and technologically
through the integration of encryption solutions into
their tools and platforms. These moments of alliance
between activist groups and industry may even present
opportunities for activists to intervene in the tech com-
panies’ trajectory. However, whilst this growth in the
range of actors discussing encryption and human rights
suggests a promising step towards a more critical
approach to the use of a technical counter-
surveillance, such as strong encryption, it also suggests
that these arguments must be made and considered
with caution. As such, this also highlights the impor-
tance of considering resistance to surveillance as a
multi-actor phenomenon within which actors can influ-
ence and strengthen one another’s positions within the
debate, even if not directly or explicitly.
Conclusion
This article has highlighted the intertwining arguments
of multiple actors within the surveillance debate, focus-
ing on the complex convergence of encryption and
human rights concerns. The implications of the find-
ings outlined suggest that as much as corporate influ-
ence can be a powerful ally against overzealous state
aspirations, it is crucial that in this alliance, civil society
is not utilised to legitimate a narrative that re-directs
attention strictly to state surveillance, and positions
corporate entities as the protectors of the public. This
will be a difficult alliance for activists to maintain
whilst remaining critical of corporate surveillance prac-
tices in the future. Furthermore, if the industry is to
appear honest about supporting our rights in online
spaces, beyond self-promotion, they may need to
move towards working more closely with their critics
who understand the social implications of all corporate
actions, not just those that fit within the protector
narrative.
For academic work within surveillance, the inter-
twining of these arguments highlights the complexity
of resistance to surveillance and the need to approach
and explore this phenomenon from a multi-actor per-
spective. The resistance debate is thus a blurring of
domains across and within actor groups, and an inter-
section of sometimes conflicting interests between
them. Consequently, this should be a central consider-
ation of any research which seeks to explore similar
cases in the future.
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